// LabPublicGoodSpecs.txt. 9/14/2020.

import Foundation

class LabPublicGoodSpecs {

let strPublicGoodSpecs :String = """

`` Lab Specs

// Demand curve slider specs
20 200 10 200		// 0: Smith demand curve intercept specs
-1.0 -0.1 .1 -.2	// 1: Smith demand curve slope specs
20 200 10 120		// 2: Jones demand curve intercept specs
-1.0 -0.1 .1 -.2	// 3: Jones demand curve slope specs
20 200 10 40		// 4: Doe demand curve intercept specs
-1.0 -0.1 .1 -.2	// 5: Doe demand curve slope specs

// Cost function slider specs
0 1000 200 0		// 6: Fixed cost specs
100 400 10 150		// 7: Linear cost specs
0.0 1.0 0.1 0.0		// 8: Quadratic cost specs

// Quantity slider specs
0 500 5 10		// 9: Limits the same as the graph specs

// Graph specs
0.0 0.0 500 450		// 9: Graph data range
Q P_(MV)		// 10: Axis names


`` Prob Specs

` Problem 0 Start
Screen 1 - Public Goods - Nash Equilibrium		// 0: Title
N			// 1: Type of solution: Nash, Voting, Lindahl

T F F			// 2: Visibility solution checkboxes: Nash, Voting, Lindahl

L L   L L   L L		// 3: Slider visibility: Intercept, slope for Smith, Jones, Doe
L			// 4: Slider visibility: Linear cost

T T T T T		// 5: Result visibility: MarVal, Price, QDem, Cost, ConsSur

T T T			// 6: Visibility consumer surplus checkboxes: Smith, Jones, Doe
T T T T			// 7: Visibility general surplus checkboxes and results:
			//	SumCons, Govt, Total, DWL

T T T T			// 8: Visibility demand curves: Smith, Jones, Doe, Lindahl

100			// 9: Initial quantity
` Text Start    	// 10: Text
`RED`BLDObjective:`BLD Illustrate the Nash public good equilibrium.`BLK

A Nash equilibrium assumes that each individual decides independently on how much of the public good to finance assuming that the decisions of the others will not change.

For a Nash equilibrium scenario, the individual with the greatest demand determines the outcome.

`BLDQuestion:`BLD Is this Smith, Jones, or Doe the determinant individual?

Adjust the quantity scrollbar, the scrollbar beneath the graph, to find the Nash equilibrium:
	`0x2022 How much of the public good is produced?
	`0x2022 What does each household contribute to finance it?
	`0x2022 Is the equilibrium efficient? Explain.

Focus on the column of checkboxes above this text box on the right. Check the boxes to illustrate the surpluses and dead weight loss.
` Prob End

` Problem 1 Start
Screen 2 - Public Goods - Majority rule Voting	// 0: Title
V			// 1: Type of solution: Nash, Voting, Lindahl

F T F			// 2: Visibility solution checkboxes: Nash, Voting, Lindahl

L L   L L   L L		// 3: Slider visibility: Intercept, slope for Smith, Jones, Doe
L			// 4: Slider visibility: Linear cost

T T T T T		// 5: Result visibility: MarVal, Price, QDem, Cost, ConsSur

T T T			// 6: Visibility consumer surplus checkboxes: Smith, Jones, Doe
T T T T			// 7: Visibility general surplus checkboxes and results:
			//	SumCons, Govt, Total, DWL
T T T T			// 8: Visibility demand curves: Smith, Jones, Doe, Lindahl

100			// 9: Initial quantity

` Text Start    	// 10: Text
`RED`BLDObjective:`BLD Illustrate the majority rule voting public good equilibrium.`BLK

Each individual pays an equal share of the public goods production costs. Then, then pairwise majority rule voting process determines the quantity to produced.

For a majority rule scenario, the median voter determines the quantity of the public good to be produced.

`BLDQuestion:`BLD Is this Smith, Jones, or Doe the determinant individual?

Adjust the quantity scrollbar to find the voting equilibrium:
	`0x2022 How much of the public good is produced?
	`0x2022 What does each household contribute to finance it?
	`0x2022 Is the equilibrium efficient? Explain.

Check the boxes above on the right to illustrate the surpluses and dead weight loss.
` Prob End

` Problem 2 Start
Screen 3 - Public Goods - Lindahl Solution		// 0: Title
L			// 1: Type of solution: Nash, Voting, Lindahl

F F T			// 2: Visibility solution checkboxes: Nash, Voting, Lindahl

L L   L L   L L		// 3: Slider visibility: Intercept, slope for Smith, Jones, Doe
L			// 4: Slider visibility: Linear cost

T T T T T		// 5: Result visibility: MarVal, Price, QDem, Cost, ConsSur

T T T			// 6: Visibility consumer surplus checkboxes: Smith, Jones, Doe
T T T T			// 7: Visibility general surplus checkboxes and results:
			//	SumCons, Govt, Total, DWL
T T T T			// 8: Visibility demand curves: Smith, Jones, Doe, Lindahl

100			// 9: Initial quantity

` Text Start    	// 10: Text
`RED`BLDObjective:`BLD Illustrate the Lindahl solution public good provision.`BLK

A Lindahl solution exists whenever two conditions are met:
1. Each individual pays a price equals to his/her marginal value for the public good.
   and
2. The revenue collected from the individuals equals the cost of producing the public good.

Adjust the quantity scrollbar to find the Lindahl solution:
	`0x2022 How much of the public good is produced?
	`0x2022 What does each household contribute to finance it?
	`0x2022 Is the equilibrium efficient? Explain.

Check the boxes above on the right to illustrate the surpluses and dead weight loss.
` Prob End

"""

}